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;

SALT LAKE CITY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,]
vs.

Case No.
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WILFORD L. McCULLOUGH,
Priority 2.0
Defendant and Appellant. )
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APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH, THE HONORABLE PAUL GRANT PRESIDING.
INTRODUCTION
The jurisdiction of the Court, nature of the proceeding,
issues, statement of the case, and statement of facts are set
forth in Appellant's opening Brief at pages 1 through 4.
Appellant takes this opportunity to respond to one of the
"facts" and to the arguments set forth in Points I and II of
Respondent's Brief.

Appellant's position is further

strengthened by the recent decision of State v. Talbot, 134
Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) published subsequent
to the filing of Appellant's brief.

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent cites and relies heavily on two Salt Lake City
ordinances for the proposition that the officer stopped the
Appellant for violating them.

Nowhere in the transcript has

the officer testified he relied on a violation of the
ordinances to stop Appellant in this case nor did he state
that he stopped Appellant on the basis of any other traffic
violation.

Officers are not allowed to make traffic stops to

investigate "hunches" about criminal activity under the guise
of a pretextual traffic violation.
The officer did not articulate a reasonable basis for
stopping the Appellant.

As objective facts were not

articulated, the officer's suspicion or mere hunch did not
justify the subsequent stop.
ARGUMENT
I.
OFFICER WILLIAMS DID NOT STATE THAT HE STOPPED
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE BECAUSE HE BELIEVED A TRAFFIC
VIOLATION HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF'S
RELIANCE ON THE ALLEGED VIOLATION IS MISPLACED.
The plaintiff asserts in its brief that the officer had
"probable cause" to believe a violation had occurred.

This

conclusory statement is unsupported by the trial transcript,
ignores the clear testimony of Officer Williams, and ignores
the specific Findings of Fact by the trial court, to-wit:
2

"7.

Based solely on the vehicle in question not proceeding

through the intersection for thirty (30) seconds, Officer
Williams stopped the vehicle in question."
The prosecution cites pages 6, 10 and 11 of the trial
transcript in an attempt to bootstrap the testimony of the
arresting officer to support counsel's conclusion that a
traffic violation was the basis for the stop of defendant's
vehicle.

To the contrary, Page 6 contains no testimony by

Officer Williams that he stopped the defendant because he
thought a traffic violation had occurred.

Pages 10 and 11 of

the trial transcript contain the the following dialogues
Mr. Cook: Let's back up to having seen him stopped
at the light without moving. Have you
ever stopped anybody for this type of
violation before?
Officer:

Yes, I have.
*••

Mr. Cook: To the best of your knowledge, is this a
violation of the law, not to proceed through a
green light?
Officer:

Yes, it is.

Mr. Cook: Have you ever stopped anybody for such a
violation before?
Officer:

Yes, I have.

Mr. Cook: Okay, based on your observation of the
defendant waiting at that light, did you
believe that he may have been impaired by the
time—based on the time he took to go through
the light?
3

Officer:

Yes, I did.

Nowhere in the above portions of the transcript nor in
any remaining portions of the transcript does the officer
testify that he stopped the defendant in this case because
defendant had committed a traffic violation by remaining at
the light for 30 seconds after it turned green.
As shown above, the officer never stated that he was
stopping the defendant in this case for a traffic violation.
In State v. Talbot, 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), this Court addressed a factual situation in which the
defendant was stopped because he had avoided a roadblock.

On

appeal, the State asserted, as a basis for stopping Talbot's
vehicle, that the defendant had committed several traffic
violations.

This Court would not permit retroactive

justification for the stop because "[i]t is inconsequential
that the officers could have stopped the vehicle for one or
more traffic violations where in fact the stop was for other
reasons."

_Id. at 17.

The prosecution concludes the defendant in this case was
stopped on the basis of a technical traffic violation but this
conclusion is unsupported by the transcript.

In fact, the

officer had a "hunch" and stopped the defendant's vehicle
because he believed the defendant was impaired.
4

Here, as in

Talbot, the prosecution should not be allowed to justify this
stop under the retroactive premise that the officer could
have stopped defendant's vehicle for traffic violations the
prosecution believes occurred prior to the stop.
II.
OFFICER WILLIAMS DID NOT ARTICULATE A REASONABLE BASIS
FOR STOPPING DEFENDANT.
Stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants is a
Fourth Amendment seizure regardless of the reason for the
stop.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v.

Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App, 1988).

A seizure is

ordinarily justified only if the stop was incident to a
traffic offense or based at least upon a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the vehicle's occupants had or were
about to commit a crime.

Sierra, 754 P.2d at 975.

An officer must articulate specific objective facts which
indicate the existence of criminal activity in order to have a
reasonable basis for stopping a vehicle.
Adv. Rep. at 17.

Talbot, 134 Utah

If the officer is unable to articulate the

facts and inferences leading to his suspicion, "the suspicion
is classified as being a mere hunch and will not justify the
subsequent stop."

Ld. (citing State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537

(Utah Ct. App. 1990) ) .
Officer Williams did not articulate any objective facts
5

that would indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.

The officer testified that the car paused for 30

seconds after the light turned green; he then stated that the
car proceeded through the light.
hereinafter T.6).

(Trial transcript at 6,

The next question posed by the prosecution

was, "What action did you take?" (T.6).

Without any

explanation regarding objective facts or reasonable
suspicions, the officer testified that he stopped the vehicle
and called on the radio that he would be stopping the vehicle.
(T.6 and 7).
The prosecution did not sustain its burden of
establishing that the officer had a reasonable articulable
suspicion to justify the stop.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant respectfully
requests this Court reverse the Trial Court's denial of
defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence pursuant to a traffic
stop.

Evidence obtained subsequent to the illegal stop should

be suppressed and the case remanded to the Trial Court for

6

withdrawal of defendant's conditional plea and trial on the
merits.
DATED this

pf

day of

Q

^_

1990.

Respectfully submitted,

Phillip W. Dyer
$
Pamela C. Urry
Attorneys for Appellant
MI:b:mccullou•rep/APP
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ADDENDUM
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(WILLIAMS - Direct by Cook)
A.

West patrol division.

Q.

Fine.

Was your attention directed toward a

Chevy truck, 19 7 3, blue over white?
A.

Yes, it was.

Q.

What first attracted your attention to that

vehicle?
A.

I don't —

I pulled up next to it, I believe

it was 200 West and 900 South, and

—

Q.

And --

A.

—

the light

Q.

—

what color was the light at that time?

A.

The light was red at that time.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes, it did.

Q.

Okay.

—

Did the light change to green?

What did the other car do when the light

changed to green?
A.

It did not move.

Q.

Can you estimate approximately how long it

didn't move at the green light?
A.

I estimated 30 seconds.

Q.

Did the vehicle then go through the light?

A.

Yes, it did.

Q.

What action then did you take?

A.

I stopped the vehicle.

Got behind it and

called on the radio that I would be stopping the

Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R.

(WILLIAMS - Direct by Cook)
vehicle.

Turned on my lightsf the overhead lights, and

pulled the vehicle over.
Q.

You were then in a squad car at this time?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Did you approach the driver of the vehicle?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Did you notice anything unusual about this

individual's condition when you approached him?
Specifically, did you notice any odor of alcoholic
beverage about this person?
A.

I noticed a very strong odor of alcohol as I

approached the driver's door.
Q.

Did you notice his —

or his eyes?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

What can you tell us about th€* condition of

his eyes?
A.

They were bloodshot.

Q.

Did you notice anything unusual about his

movements when he got out of *the car?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

What did you notice?

A.

He was very unstable.

Q.

Did you have a conversation with him at this

A.

Yes, I did.

time?

7
Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R.

(WILLIAMS - Direct by Cook)
Q.

Is he here in the courtroom?

A.

Yes, he is.

Q.

Would you please indicate where?

A.

In the blue suit, red tie.

Q.

And what color shirt?

A.

Light blue.
MR. COOK:

May the record reflect

identification, your Honor?
THE COURT:
Q.

It is so indicated.

Let's back up to having seen him stopped at the

light without moving.

Have you ever stopped anybody for

this type of violation before?
A.

Yes, I have.
MR. DYER:

Objection, your Honor.

I don't

believe that there's been any testimony that there was a
violation.

Q.

MR. COOK:

Okay.

MR. DYER:

(Inaudible).

To the best of your knowledge
MR. COOK:

Q.

—

I'll rephrase, your Honor.

To the best of your knowledge, is this a

violation of the law, not to proceed through a green
light?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

Have you ever stopped anybody for such a
10
Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R.

(WILLIAMS - Cross by Dyer)
violation before?
A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

Okay.

Based on your observation of the

defendant waiting at that light, did you believe that he
may have been impaired by the time —

based on

the time that he took to go through the light?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Nothing further of the witness, your Honor.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. DYER:
Q.

Officer, is it your testimony then, as I

understand it, that the basis for your investigation was
the length of time that the vehicle was stopped at the
intersection; is that correct?
A.

That's what initiated the investigation,

that's not the basis of the rest of the investigation.
Q.

Okay, I'm with you.

But that's the -- that

is the basis upon which you decided to stop
Mr. McCullough's vehicle, correct?

There was -- you

didn't base it on any sort of a driving pattern or any
other conduct that you observed?
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

And also is your testimony, if I'm not

correct, that you said it is a violation of law to not
11
Kelly Hollenbeck - C.S.R.

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I, Pamela C. Urry, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals,
400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102 and four copies to:
GLEN COOK, ESQ.
SALT LAKE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this

5? F day of

/I,,

1990.

PAMELA C. URRY, ESQf.

